Competition vs. Stability : Oligopolistic Banking System with Run Risk /
This paper develops a model where large financial intermediaries subject to systemic runs internalize the effect of their leverage on aggregate risk, returns and asset prices. Near the steady-state, they restrict leverage to avoid the risk of a run which gives rise to an accelerator effect. For larg...
| Hoofdauteur: | |
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| Formaat: | Tijdschrift |
| Taal: | English |
| Gepubliceerd in: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2021.
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| Reeks: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 2021/102 |
| Onderwerpen: | |
| Online toegang: | Full text available on IMF |
| Samenvatting: | This paper develops a model where large financial intermediaries subject to systemic runs internalize the effect of their leverage on aggregate risk, returns and asset prices. Near the steady-state, they restrict leverage to avoid the risk of a run which gives rise to an accelerator effect. For large adverse shocks, the system enters a zone with high leverage and possibly runs. The length of time the system remains in this zone depends on the degree of concentration through a franchise value, price-drop and recapitalization channels. The speed of entry of new banks after a collapse has a stabilizing effect. |
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| Beschrijving item: | <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required |
| Fysieke beschrijving: | 1 online resource (74 pages) |
| Formaat: | Mode of access: Internet |
| ISSN: | 1018-5941 |
| Toegang: | Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students |