Competition vs. Stability : Oligopolistic Banking System with Run Risk /
This paper develops a model where large financial intermediaries subject to systemic runs internalize the effect of their leverage on aggregate risk, returns and asset prices. Near the steady-state, they restrict leverage to avoid the risk of a run which gives rise to an accelerator effect. For larg...
| Tác giả chính: | |
|---|---|
| Định dạng: | Tạp chí |
| Ngôn ngữ: | English |
| Được phát hành: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2021.
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| Loạt: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 2021/102 |
| Những chủ đề: | |
| Truy cập trực tuyến: | Full text available on IMF |