Trust As a Means of Improving Corporate Governance and Efficiency /
Agency problems within the firm are a significant hindrance to efficiency. We propose trust between coworkers as a superior alternative to the standard tools used to mitigate agency problems: increased monitoring and incentive-based pay. We show how trust induces employees to work harder, relative t...
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| Định dạng: | Tạp chí |
| Ngôn ngữ: | English |
| Được phát hành: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2002.
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| Loạt: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 2002/033 |
| Truy cập trực tuyến: | Full text available on IMF |