Imperfect Central Bank Communication : Information versus Distraction /
Much of the information communicated by central banks is noisy or imperfect. This paper considers the potential benefits and limitations of central bank communications in a model of imperfect knowledge and learning. It is shown that the value of communicating imperfect information is ambiguous. Ther...
| Tác giả chính: | |
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| Tác giả khác: | , |
| Định dạng: | Tạp chí |
| Ngôn ngữ: | English |
| Được phát hành: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2008.
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| Loạt: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 2008/060 |
| Truy cập trực tuyến: | Full text available on IMF |