Imperfect Central Bank Communication : Information versus Distraction /

Much of the information communicated by central banks is noisy or imperfect. This paper considers the potential benefits and limitations of central bank communications in a model of imperfect knowledge and learning. It is shown that the value of communicating imperfect information is ambiguous. Ther...

Täydet tiedot

Bibliografiset tiedot
Päätekijä: Orphanides, Athanasios
Muut tekijät: Dale, Spencer, Osterholm, Par
Aineistotyyppi: Aikakauslehti
Kieli:English
Julkaistu: Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2008.
Sarja:IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2008/060
Linkit:Full text available on IMF