Imperfect Central Bank Communication : Information versus Distraction /

Much of the information communicated by central banks is noisy or imperfect. This paper considers the potential benefits and limitations of central bank communications in a model of imperfect knowledge and learning. It is shown that the value of communicating imperfect information is ambiguous. Ther...

詳細記述

書誌詳細
第一著者: Orphanides, Athanasios
その他の著者: Dale, Spencer, Osterholm, Par
フォーマット: 雑誌
言語:English
出版事項: Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2008.
シリーズ:IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2008/060
オンライン・アクセス:Full text available on IMF