Imperfect Central Bank Communication : Information versus Distraction /

Much of the information communicated by central banks is noisy or imperfect. This paper considers the potential benefits and limitations of central bank communications in a model of imperfect knowledge and learning. It is shown that the value of communicating imperfect information is ambiguous. Ther...

पूर्ण विवरण

ग्रंथसूची विवरण
मुख्य लेखक: Orphanides, Athanasios
अन्य लेखक: Dale, Spencer, Osterholm, Par
स्वरूप: पत्रिका
भाषा:English
प्रकाशित: Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2008.
श्रृंखला:IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2008/060
ऑनलाइन पहुंच:Full text available on IMF