Imperfect Central Bank Communication : Information versus Distraction /

Much of the information communicated by central banks is noisy or imperfect. This paper considers the potential benefits and limitations of central bank communications in a model of imperfect knowledge and learning. It is shown that the value of communicating imperfect information is ambiguous. Ther...

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מידע ביבליוגרפי
מחבר ראשי: Orphanides, Athanasios
מחברים אחרים: Dale, Spencer, Osterholm, Par
פורמט: כתב-עת
שפה:English
יצא לאור: Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2008.
סדרה:IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2008/060
גישה מקוונת:Full text available on IMF