Imperfect Central Bank Communication : Information versus Distraction /
Much of the information communicated by central banks is noisy or imperfect. This paper considers the potential benefits and limitations of central bank communications in a model of imperfect knowledge and learning. It is shown that the value of communicating imperfect information is ambiguous. Ther...
| প্রধান লেখক: | |
|---|---|
| অন্যান্য লেখক: | , |
| বিন্যাস: | পত্রিকা |
| ভাষা: | English |
| প্রকাশিত: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2008.
|
| মালা: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 2008/060 |
| অনলাইন ব্যবহার করুন: | Full text available on IMF |