Are Asset Price Guarantees Useful for Preventing Sudden Stops?A Quantitative Investigation of the Globalization Hazard-Moral Hazard Tradeoff /
An implication of the "globalization hazard" hypothesis is that sudden stops could be prevented by offering foreign investors price guarantees on emerging markets assets. These guarantees create a tradeoff, however, because they weaken globalization hazard by creating international moral h...
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| Format: | Revista |
| Idioma: | English |
| Publicat: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2006.
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| Col·lecció: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 2006/073 |
| Accés en línia: | Full text available on IMF |