Bond Restructuring and Moral Hazard : Are Collective Action Clauses Costly? /
Many official groups have endorsed the wider use by emerging market borrowers of contract clauses which allow for a qualified majority of bondholders to restructure repayment terms in the event of financial distress. Some have argued that such clauses will be associated with moral hazard and increas...
मुख्य लेखक: | |
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अन्य लेखक: | , |
स्वरूप: | पत्रिका |
भाषा: | English |
प्रकाशित: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2001.
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श्रृंखला: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 2001/092 |
ऑनलाइन पहुंच: | Full text available on IMF |