Bond Restructuring and Moral Hazard : Are Collective Action Clauses Costly? /

Many official groups have endorsed the wider use by emerging market borrowers of contract clauses which allow for a qualified majority of bondholders to restructure repayment terms in the event of financial distress. Some have argued that such clauses will be associated with moral hazard and increas...

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Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor principal: Becker, Torbjorn
Outros Autores: Richards, Anthony, Thaicharoen, Yunyong
Formato: Periódico
Idioma:English
Publicado em: Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2001.
coleção:IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2001/092
Acesso em linha:Full text available on IMF