Bond Restructuring and Moral Hazard : Are Collective Action Clauses Costly? /

Many official groups have endorsed the wider use by emerging market borrowers of contract clauses which allow for a qualified majority of bondholders to restructure repayment terms in the event of financial distress. Some have argued that such clauses will be associated with moral hazard and increas...

Täydet tiedot

Bibliografiset tiedot
Päätekijä: Becker, Torbjorn
Muut tekijät: Richards, Anthony, Thaicharoen, Yunyong
Aineistotyyppi: Aikakauslehti
Kieli:English
Julkaistu: Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2001.
Sarja:IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2001/092
Linkit:Full text available on IMF