Voting Right Rotation, Behavior of Committee Members and Financial Market Reactions : Evidence from the U.S. Federal Open Market Committee /

Which Federal Reserve Bank presidents vote on the U.S. monetary policy committee depends on a mechanical, yearly rotation scheme. Rotation is without exclusion: nonvoting presidents do attend and participate in the meetings of the committee. We test two hypotheses about the dependence of presidents&...

詳細記述

書誌詳細
第一著者: Ehrmann, Michael
その他の著者: Tietz, Robin, Visser, Bauke.
フォーマット: 雑誌
言語:English
出版事項: Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2022.
シリーズ:IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2022/105
主題:
オンライン・アクセス:Full text available on IMF
LEADER 02209cas a2200325 a 4500
001 AALejournalIMF022908
008 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d
020 |c 20.00 USD 
020 |z 9798400210075 
022 |a 1018-5941 
040 |a BD-DhAAL  |c BD-DhAAL 
100 1 |a Ehrmann, Michael. 
245 1 0 |a Voting Right Rotation, Behavior of Committee Members and Financial Market Reactions :   |b Evidence from the U.S. Federal Open Market Committee /  |c Michael Ehrmann, Robin Tietz, Bauke Visser. 
264 1 |a Washington, D.C. :  |b International Monetary Fund,  |c 2022. 
300 |a 1 online resource (44 pages) 
490 1 |a IMF Working Papers 
500 |a <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required 
500 |a <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required 
506 |a Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students 
520 3 |a Which Federal Reserve Bank presidents vote on the U.S. monetary policy committee depends on a mechanical, yearly rotation scheme. Rotation is without exclusion: nonvoting presidents do attend and participate in the meetings of the committee. We test two hypotheses about the dependence of presidents' behavior on voting status. (i) Loss compensation: presidents compensate the loss of the right to vote with an increased use of speeches and contributions. (ii) Motivation: presidents complement the right to vote with an increased use of speeches and contributions. The evidence favors the motivation hypothesis. Also, in years that presidents vote, their speeches move financial markets less than in years they do not vote. We argue that this vote discount is consistent with presidents' communication behavior. 
538 |a Mode of access: Internet 
650 7 |a Associations  |2 imf 
650 7 |a Clubs  |2 imf 
650 7 |a Committees  |2 imf 
650 7 |a Models of Political Processes  |2 imf 
650 7 |a Social Choice  |2 imf 
700 1 |a Tietz, Robin. 
700 1 |a Visser, Bauke.. 
830 0 |a IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;  |v No. 2022/105 
856 4 0 |z Full text available on IMF  |u https://elibrary.imf.org/openurl?genre=journal&issn=1018-5941&volume=2022&issue=105  |z IMF e-Library