A Model of the Imf As a Coinsurance Arrangement /

The paper shows that a coinsurance arrangement among countries can, in principle, play a useful role in helping countries bear the risks involved in developing their economies and integrating into the global financial system. The operation of the coinsurance arrangement is examined under different l...

Täydet tiedot

Bibliografiset tiedot
Päätekijä: Chami, Ralph
Muut tekijät: Sharma, Sunil., Shim, Ilhyock
Aineistotyyppi: Aikakauslehti
Kieli:English
Julkaistu: Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2004.
Sarja:IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2004/219
Aiheet:
Linkit:Full text available on IMF
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100 1 |a Chami, Ralph. 
245 1 2 |a A Model of the Imf As a Coinsurance Arrangement /  |c Ralph Chami, Ilhyock Shim, Sunil Sharma. 
264 1 |a Washington, D.C. :  |b International Monetary Fund,  |c 2004. 
300 |a 1 online resource (44 pages) 
490 1 |a IMF Working Papers 
500 |a <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required 
500 |a <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required 
506 |a Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students 
520 3 |a The paper shows that a coinsurance arrangement among countries can, in principle, play a useful role in helping countries bear the risks involved in developing their economies and integrating into the global financial system. The operation of the coinsurance arrangement is examined under different loan contracts offered by the IMF. The analysis suggests that, if the IMF's objective is to safeguard its resources and be concerned about the welfare of the borrower, an ex ante loan contract is more likely to create the right incentives-induce higher effort by member countries to avoid and overcome crises-than an ex-post loan contract. Such ex ante contracts highlight the need for precommitment to contend with the Samaritan's dilemma and time inconsistency. The paper also shows that state-contingent repayment schemes are needed to deal with King Lear's dilemma. 
538 |a Mode of access: Internet 
650 7 |a Asymmetric and Private Information  |2 imf 
700 1 |a Sharma, Sunil.. 
700 1 |a Shim, Ilhyock. 
830 0 |a IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;  |v No. 2004/219 
856 4 0 |z Full text available on IMF  |u https://elibrary.imf.org/openurl?genre=journal&issn=1018-5941&volume=2004&issue=219  |z IMF e-Library