Sovereign Cocos /
We study a model of equilibrium sovereign default in which the government issues cocos (contingent convertible bonds) that stipulate a suspension of debt payments when the government faces liquidity shocks in the form of an increase of the bondholders' risk aversion. We find that in spite of re...
| 第一著者: | |
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| その他の著者: | , , |
| フォーマット: | 雑誌 |
| 言語: | English |
| 出版事項: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2022.
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| シリーズ: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 2022/078 |
| 主題: | |
| オンライン･アクセス: | Full text available on IMF |