Sovereign Cocos /

We study a model of equilibrium sovereign default in which the government issues cocos (contingent convertible bonds) that stipulate a suspension of debt payments when the government faces liquidity shocks in the form of an increase of the bondholders' risk aversion. We find that in spite of re...

पूर्ण विवरण

ग्रंथसूची विवरण
मुख्य लेखक: Hatchondo, Juan Carlos
अन्य लेखक: Martinez, Leonardo, Onder, Kursat, Roch, Francisco
स्वरूप: पत्रिका
भाषा:English
प्रकाशित: Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2022.
श्रृंखला:IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2022/078
विषय:
ऑनलाइन पहुंच:Full text available on IMF
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100 1 |a Hatchondo, Juan Carlos. 
245 1 0 |a Sovereign Cocos /  |c Juan Carlos Hatchondo, Leonardo Martinez, Kursat Onder, Francisco Roch. 
264 1 |a Washington, D.C. :  |b International Monetary Fund,  |c 2022. 
300 |a 1 online resource (26 pages) 
490 1 |a IMF Working Papers 
500 |a <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required 
500 |a <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required 
506 |a Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students 
520 3 |a We study a model of equilibrium sovereign default in which the government issues cocos (contingent convertible bonds) that stipulate a suspension of debt payments when the government faces liquidity shocks in the form of an increase of the bondholders' risk aversion. We find that in spite of reducing the frequency of defaults triggered by liquidity shocks, introducing cocos increases the overall default frequency. By mitigating concerns about liquidity, cocos make indebtedness and default risk more attractive for the government. In contrast, cocos that stipulate debt forgiveness when the government faces the shock, achieve larger welfare gains by reducing default risk. 
538 |a Mode of access: Internet 
650 7 |a Current Account Adjustment  |2 imf 
650 7 |a Default Risk  |2 imf 
650 7 |a International Lending and Debt Problems  |2 imf 
650 7 |a Short-Term Capital Movements  |2 imf 
650 7 |a Sovereign Cocos  |2 imf 
700 1 |a Martinez, Leonardo. 
700 1 |a Onder, Kursat. 
700 1 |a Roch, Francisco. 
830 0 |a IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;  |v No. 2022/078 
856 4 0 |z Full text available on IMF  |u https://elibrary.imf.org/openurl?genre=journal&issn=1018-5941&volume=2022&issue=078  |z IMF e-Library