Robust Optimal Macroprudential Policy /

We consider how fear of model misspecification on the part of the planner and/or the households affects welfare gains from optimal macroprudential taxes in an economy with occasionally binding collateral constraints as in Bianchi (2011). On the one hand, there exist welfare gains from internalizing...

Täydet tiedot

Bibliografiset tiedot
Päätekijä: Montamat, Giselle
Muut tekijät: Roch, Francisco
Aineistotyyppi: Aikakauslehti
Kieli:English
Julkaistu: Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2021.
Sarja:IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2021/055
Aiheet:
Linkit:Full text available on IMF