Robust Optimal Macroprudential Policy /
We consider how fear of model misspecification on the part of the planner and/or the households affects welfare gains from optimal macroprudential taxes in an economy with occasionally binding collateral constraints as in Bianchi (2011). On the one hand, there exist welfare gains from internalizing...
| Главный автор: | Montamat, Giselle |
|---|---|
| Другие авторы: | Roch, Francisco |
| Формат: | Журнал |
| Язык: | English |
| Опубликовано: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2021.
|
| Серии: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 2021/055 |
| Предметы: | |
| Online-ссылка: | Full text available on IMF |
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