The Great Lockdown : International Risk Sharing Through Trade and Policy Coordination /

Voluntary and government-mandated lockdowns in response to COVID-19 have caused causing drastic reductions in economic activity around the world. We present a parsimonious two-country-SIR model with some degree of substitutability between home and foreign goods, and show that trading partners'...

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Bibliografiska uppgifter
Huvudupphovsman: Engler, Philipp
Övriga upphovsmän: Pouokam, Nathalie, Rodriguez Guzman, Diego, Yakadina, Irina
Materialtyp: Tidskrift
Språk:English
Publicerad: Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2020.
Serie:IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2020/242
Länkar:Full text available on IMF
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245 1 4 |a The Great Lockdown :   |b International Risk Sharing Through Trade and Policy Coordination /  |c Philipp Engler, Nathalie Pouokam, Diego Rodriguez Guzman, Irina Yakadina. 
264 1 |a Washington, D.C. :  |b International Monetary Fund,  |c 2020. 
300 |a 1 online resource (29 pages) 
490 1 |a IMF Working Papers 
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500 |a <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required 
506 |a Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students 
520 3 |a Voluntary and government-mandated lockdowns in response to COVID-19 have caused causing drastic reductions in economic activity around the world. We present a parsimonious two-country-SIR model with some degree of substitutability between home and foreign goods, and show that trading partners' asynchronous entries into the global pandemic induce mutual welfare gains from trade. Those gains are realized through exchange rate adjustments that cause a temporary reallocation of production towards the economy with the lowest infection rate at any point in time. We show that international cooperation over containment policies that aim at optimizing global welfare further enhances the ability of countries to exploit trade opportunities to contain the spread of the pandemic. We characterize the Nash game of strategic choices of containment policies as a prisoners' dilemma. 
538 |a Mode of access: Internet 
700 1 |a Pouokam, Nathalie. 
700 1 |a Rodriguez Guzman, Diego. 
700 1 |a Yakadina, Irina. 
830 0 |a IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;  |v No. 2020/242 
856 4 0 |z Full text available on IMF  |u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2020/242/001.2020.issue-242-en.xml  |z IMF e-Library