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|z 9781513557045
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|a 1934-7685
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|a BD-DhAAL
|c BD-DhAAL
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|a International Monetary Fund.
|b Monetary and Capital Markets Department.
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|a Republic of Korea :
|b Financial Sector Assessment Program-Technical Note-Non-Financial Balance Sheet Vulnerabilities and Risks to Financial Stability.
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|a Washington, D.C. :
|b International Monetary Fund,
|c 2020.
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|a 1 online resource (49 pages)
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|a IMF Staff Country Reports
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|a <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required
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|a <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required
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|a Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students
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|a Non-Financial Corporate Sector. Non-financial corporate leverage as share of GDP in Korea remains higher than peer countries but has remained stable since 2013 at around 100 percent of GDP. The stock of non-corporate debt has become slightly more resilient due to the deleveraging of non-conglomerate affiliated firms. Average firm performance has remained resilient for conglomerate-affiliated corporates but weakened for all other firms. As a result, despite the low interest rate environment, around one-quarter of total corporate debt (around 28 percent of GDP) is registered 'at-risk'. Banks balance sheets are at risk as over half of non-financial corporate debt-at-risk resides with SMEs; Stress tests show that (i) Korean firms which are more indebted, less profitable, smaller and have lower turnover are more likely to experience difficulties servicing their debt; (ii) corporate balance sheets are vulnerable to a sudden hike in interest rates, which combined with a profit shock, could double the amount of debt-at-risk held by non-SME firms and; (iii) exchange rate shocks appear manageable given low FX debt and natural FX hedges. Under a downside macro-financial stress test scenario, non-SME credit losses would total a touch over 2 percent of GDP. Bank stress tests suggest that the maximum cumulative bank losses from distressed SME loans in a stress scenario would total around 2 percent of GDP. Together, these losses would be broadly manageable for the financial system to absorb.
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|a Mode of access: Internet
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|a IMF Staff Country Reports; Country Report ;
|v No. 2020/278
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|z Full text available on IMF
|u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/002/2020/278/002.2020.issue-278-en.xml
|z IMF e-Library
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