Credibility Dynamics and Disinflation Plans /
We study the optimal design of a disinflation plan by a planner who lacks commitment. Having announced a plan, the Central banker faces a tradeoff between surprise inflation and building reputation, defined as the private sector's belief that the Central bank is committed to the plan. Some plan...
| 第一著者: | |
|---|---|
| その他の著者: | |
| フォーマット: | 雑誌 |
| 言語: | English |
| 出版事項: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2020.
|
| シリーズ: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 2020/085 |
| 主題: | |
| オンライン･アクセス: | Full text available on IMF |