Credibility Dynamics and Disinflation Plans /
We study the optimal design of a disinflation plan by a planner who lacks commitment. Having announced a plan, the Central banker faces a tradeoff between surprise inflation and building reputation, defined as the private sector's belief that the Central bank is committed to the plan. Some plan...
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| Άλλοι συγγραφείς: | |
| Μορφή: | Επιστημονικό περιοδικό |
| Γλώσσα: | English |
| Έκδοση: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2020.
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| Σειρά: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 2020/085 |
| Θέματα: | |
| Διαθέσιμο Online: | Full text available on IMF |