Do Old Habits Die Hard? : Central Banks and the Bretton Woods Gold Puzzle /
Why did monetary authorities hold large gold reserves under Bretton Woods (1944-1971) when only the US had to? We argue that gold holdings were driven by institutional memory and persistent habits of central bankers. Countries continued to back currency in circulation with gold reserves, following r...
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| Định dạng: | Tạp chí |
| Ngôn ngữ: | English |
| Được phát hành: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2019.
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| Loạt: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 2019/161 |
| Truy cập trực tuyến: | Full text available on IMF |