Doing More for Less? : New Evidence on Lobbying and Government Contracts /

Why do firms lobby? This paper exploits the unanticipated sequestration of federal budget accounts in March 2013 that reduced the availability of government funds disbursed through procurement contracts to shed light on this question. Following this event, firms with little or no prior exposure to t...

Täydet tiedot

Bibliografiset tiedot
Päätekijä: Agca, Senay
Muut tekijät: Igan, Deniz, Li, Fuhong, Mishra, Prachi
Aineistotyyppi: Aikakauslehti
Kieli:English
Julkaistu: Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2019.
Sarja:IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2019/172
Aiheet:
Linkit:Full text available on IMF
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245 1 0 |a Doing More for Less? :   |b New Evidence on Lobbying and Government Contracts /  |c Senay Agca, Deniz Igan, Fuhong Li, Prachi Mishra. 
264 1 |a Washington, D.C. :  |b International Monetary Fund,  |c 2019. 
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520 3 |a Why do firms lobby? This paper exploits the unanticipated sequestration of federal budget accounts in March 2013 that reduced the availability of government funds disbursed through procurement contracts to shed light on this question. Following this event, firms with little or no prior exposure to the federal accounts that experienced cuts reduced their lobbying spending. In contrast, firms with a high degree of exposure to the cuts maintained and even increased their lobbying spending. This suggests that, when the same number of contractors competed for a piece of a reduced pie, the more affected firms likely intensified their lobbying efforts to distinguish themselves from the others and improve their chances of procuring a larger share of the smaller overall. These findings are stronger in government-dependent sectors and when there is intense competition. The evidence is more consistent with a rent-seeking explanation for lobbying. 
538 |a Mode of access: Internet 
650 7 |a Firm Level  |2 imf 
650 7 |a Level Competition  |2 imf 
650 7 |a Natural Logarithm  |2 imf 
650 7 |a Sequestered Firm  |2 imf 
650 7 |a WP  |2 imf 
651 7 |a United States  |2 imf 
700 1 |a Igan, Deniz. 
700 1 |a Li, Fuhong. 
700 1 |a Mishra, Prachi. 
830 0 |a IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;  |v No. 2019/172 
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