|
|
|
|
| LEADER |
02727cas a2200241 a 4500 |
| 001 |
AALejournalIMF019211 |
| 008 |
230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d |
| 020 |
|
|
|c 5.00 USD
|
| 020 |
|
|
|z 9781498307284
|
| 022 |
|
|
|a 2663-3493
|
| 040 |
|
|
|a BD-DhAAL
|c BD-DhAAL
|
| 110 |
2 |
|
|a International Monetary Fund.
|b Strategy, Policy, and Review Department.
|
| 245 |
1 |
0 |
|a Program Design in Currency Unions.
|
| 264 |
|
1 |
|a Washington, D.C. :
|b International Monetary Fund,
|c 2018.
|
| 300 |
|
|
|a 1 online resource (71 pages)
|
| 490 |
1 |
|
|a Policy Papers
|
| 500 |
|
|
|a <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required
|
| 500 |
|
|
|a <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required
|
| 506 |
|
|
|a Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students
|
| 520 |
3 |
|
|a Despite a long history of program engagement, the Fund has not developed guidance on program design in members of currency unions. The Fund has engaged with members of the four currency unions-the Central African Economic and Monetary Community, the Eastern Caribbean Currency Union, the European Monetary Union, and the West African Economic and Monetary Union-under Fund-supported programs. In some cases, union-wide institutions supported their members in undertaking adjustment under Fund-supported programs. As such, several programs incorporated-on an ad hoc basis-critical policy actions that union members had delegated. Providing general guidance on program design for members in a currency union context would fill a gap in Fund policy and help ensure consistent, transparent, and evenhanded treatment across Fund-supported programs. This paper considers two options on when and how the Fund should seek policy assurances from union-level institutions in programs of currency union members. Option 1 would involve amending the Conditionality Guidelines, which would allow the use of standard conditionality tools with respect to actions by union-level institutions. Option 2-which staff prefers-proposes formalizing current practices and providing general guidance regarding principles and modalities on policy assurances from union-level institutions in support of members' adjustment programs. Neither option would infringe upon the independence (or legally-provided autonomy) of union-level institutions, since the institutions would decide what measures or policy actions to take-just as any independent central bank or monetary authority does, for example, in non-CU members.
|
| 538 |
|
|
|a Mode of access: Internet
|
| 830 |
|
0 |
|a Policy Papers; Policy Paper ;
|v No. 2018/011
|
| 856 |
4 |
0 |
|z Full text available on IMF
|u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/007/2018/011/007.2018.issue-011-en.xml
|z IMF e-Library
|