Program Design in Currency Unions.
Despite a long history of program engagement, the Fund has not developed guidance on program design in members of currency unions. The Fund has engaged with members of the four currency unions-the Central African Economic and Monetary Community, the Eastern Caribbean Currency Union, the European Mon...
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| Formato: | Revista |
| Lenguaje: | English |
| Publicado: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2018.
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| Colección: | Policy Papers; Policy Paper ;
No. 2018/011 |
| Acceso en línea: | Full text available on IMF |
| Sumario: | Despite a long history of program engagement, the Fund has not developed guidance on program design in members of currency unions. The Fund has engaged with members of the four currency unions-the Central African Economic and Monetary Community, the Eastern Caribbean Currency Union, the European Monetary Union, and the West African Economic and Monetary Union-under Fund-supported programs. In some cases, union-wide institutions supported their members in undertaking adjustment under Fund-supported programs. As such, several programs incorporated-on an ad hoc basis-critical policy actions that union members had delegated. Providing general guidance on program design for members in a currency union context would fill a gap in Fund policy and help ensure consistent, transparent, and evenhanded treatment across Fund-supported programs. This paper considers two options on when and how the Fund should seek policy assurances from union-level institutions in programs of currency union members. Option 1 would involve amending the Conditionality Guidelines, which would allow the use of standard conditionality tools with respect to actions by union-level institutions. Option 2-which staff prefers-proposes formalizing current practices and providing general guidance regarding principles and modalities on policy assurances from union-level institutions in support of members' adjustment programs. Neither option would infringe upon the independence (or legally-provided autonomy) of union-level institutions, since the institutions would decide what measures or policy actions to take-just as any independent central bank or monetary authority does, for example, in non-CU members. |
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| Notas: | <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required |
| Descripción Física: | 1 online resource (71 pages) |
| Formato: | Mode of access: Internet |
| ISSN: | 2663-3493 |
| Acceso: | Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students |