Legal Protection : Liability and Immunity Arrangements of Central Banks and Financial Supervisors /
This paper argues that central bank legal protection contributes to safeguarding a central bank and its financial supervisor's independence, especially for conducting monetary and financial stability policy. However, such legal protection also entails enhanced accountability. To this end, the p...
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| Format: | Journal |
| Language: | English |
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Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2018.
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| Series: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 2018/176 |
| Online Access: | Full text available on IMF |
| Summary: | This paper argues that central bank legal protection contributes to safeguarding a central bank and its financial supervisor's independence, especially for conducting monetary and financial stability policy. However, such legal protection also entails enhanced accountability. To this end, the paper provides a selected overview of legal protection for central banks and financial supervisors (if the supervisor is part of the central bank), focusing on liability, immunity, and indemnification arrangements, and based on the IMF's Central Bank Legislation Database. The paper also uses data from the IMF's Article IV and FSAP Database, and the IMF MCM's Technical Assistance Database. It lists selected country cases for illustrative purposes. It introduces the concepts of 'appropriate legal protection' and 'function-specific legal protection' as topics for further research. |
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| Item Description: | <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required |
| Physical Description: | 1 online resource (42 pages) |
| Format: | Mode of access: Internet |
| ISSN: | 1018-5941 |
| Access: | Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students |