Does Financial Tranquility Call for Stringent Regulation? /

Consistent with the Minsky hypothesis and the 'volatility paradox' (Brunnermeier and Sannikov, 2014), recent empirical evidence suggests that financial crises tend to follow prolonged periods of financial stability and investor optimism. But does financial tranquility always call for more...

Ful tanımlama

Detaylı Bibliyografya
Yazar: Basak, Deepal
Diğer Yazarlar: Zhao, Yunhui
Materyal Türü: Dergi
Dil:English
Baskı/Yayın Bilgisi: Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2018.
Seri Bilgileri:IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2018/123
Online Erişim:Full text available on IMF
LEADER 02090cas a2200253 a 4500
001 AALejournalIMF018495
008 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d
020 |c 5.00 USD 
020 |z 9781484357996 
022 |a 1018-5941 
040 |a BD-DhAAL  |c BD-DhAAL 
100 1 |a Basak, Deepal. 
245 1 0 |a Does Financial Tranquility Call for Stringent Regulation? /  |c Deepal Basak, Yunhui Zhao. 
264 1 |a Washington, D.C. :  |b International Monetary Fund,  |c 2018. 
300 |a 1 online resource (41 pages) 
490 1 |a IMF Working Papers 
500 |a <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required 
500 |a <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required 
506 |a Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students 
520 3 |a Consistent with the Minsky hypothesis and the 'volatility paradox' (Brunnermeier and Sannikov, 2014), recent empirical evidence suggests that financial crises tend to follow prolonged periods of financial stability and investor optimism. But does financial tranquility always call for more stringent regulation over time? We examine this question using a simple portfolio choice model that features the interaction between learning and externality. We evaluate the potential of a macroprudential policy to restore efficiency, and characterize the necessary and sufficient condition for the countercyclicality of the optimal regulation/macroprudential policy. Our paper implies that policymakers should not only consider the cyclical indicators 'on the surface' (for example, credit growth), but also closely examine the deep structural change of the resilience of the system. The paper also highlights the importance of assigning the macroprudential policy function to independent agencies with technical expertise. 
538 |a Mode of access: Internet 
700 1 |a Zhao, Yunhui. 
830 0 |a IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;  |v No. 2018/123 
856 4 0 |z Full text available on IMF  |u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2018/123/001.2018.issue-123-en.xml  |z IMF e-Library