Debt Seniority and Sovereign Debt Crises /
Is the seniority structure of sovereign debt neutral for a government's decision between defaulting and raising surpluses? In this paper, we address this question using a model of debt crises where a discretionary government endogenously chooses distortionary taxation and whether to apply an op...
| Tác giả chính: | |
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| Tác giả khác: | , |
| Định dạng: | Tạp chí |
| Ngôn ngữ: | English |
| Được phát hành: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2018.
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| Loạt: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 2018/104 |
| Truy cập trực tuyến: | Full text available on IMF |