Debt Seniority and Sovereign Debt Crises /
Is the seniority structure of sovereign debt neutral for a government's decision between defaulting and raising surpluses? In this paper, we address this question using a model of debt crises where a discretionary government endogenously chooses distortionary taxation and whether to apply an op...
| מחבר ראשי: | |
|---|---|
| מחברים אחרים: | , |
| פורמט: | כתב-עת |
| שפה: | English |
| יצא לאור: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2018.
|
| סדרה: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 2018/104 |
| גישה מקוונת: | Full text available on IMF |