A Central Fiscal Stabilization Capacity for the Euro Area /

This note outlines a concrete proposal for a euro area central fiscal capacity (CFC) that could help smooth both country-specific and common shocks. Specifically, it proposes a macroeconomic stabilization fund financed by annual contributions from countries that are used to build up assets in good t...

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Xehetasun bibliografikoak
Egile nagusia: Arnold, Nathaniel
Beste egile batzuk: Barkbu, Bergljot, Ture, H. Elif, Wang, Hou
Formatua: Aldizkaria
Hizkuntza:English
Argitaratua: Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2018.
Saila:Staff Discussion Notes; Staff Discussion Notes ; No. 2018/003
Sarrera elektronikoa:Full text available on IMF
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100 1 |a Arnold, Nathaniel. 
245 1 2 |a A Central Fiscal Stabilization Capacity for the Euro Area /  |c Nathaniel Arnold, Bergljot Barkbu, H. Elif Ture, Hou Wang. 
264 1 |a Washington, D.C. :  |b International Monetary Fund,  |c 2018. 
300 |a 1 online resource (57 pages) 
490 1 |a Staff Discussion Notes 
500 |a <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required 
500 |a <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required 
506 |a Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students 
520 3 |a This note outlines a concrete proposal for a euro area central fiscal capacity (CFC) that could help smooth both country-specific and common shocks. Specifically, it proposes a macroeconomic stabilization fund financed by annual contributions from countries that are used to build up assets in good times and make transfers to countries in bad times, as well as a borrowing capacity in case an exceptionally large shock exhausts the fund's assets. To address moral hazard risks, transfers from the CFC-beyond a country's own net contributions-would be conditional on compliance with the EU fiscal rules. The note also discusses several features aimed at avoiding permanent transfers between countries and making the CFC function as automatically as possible-to limit the scope for disputes over its operation-both of which are important points to make it politically acceptable. 
538 |a Mode of access: Internet 
700 1 |a Barkbu, Bergljot. 
700 1 |a Ture, H. Elif. 
700 1 |a Wang, Hou. 
830 0 |a Staff Discussion Notes; Staff Discussion Notes ;  |v No. 2018/003 
856 4 0 |z Full text available on IMF  |u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/006/2018/003/006.2018.issue-003-en.xml  |z IMF e-Library