Job Protection Deregulation in Good and Bad Times /

This paper explores the short-term employment effect of deregulating job protection for regular workers and how it varies with prevailing business cycle conditions. We apply a local projection method to a newly constructed 'narrative' dataset of major regular job protection reforms coverin...

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Главный автор: Duval, Romain
Другие авторы: Furceri, Davide, Jalles, Joao Tovar
Формат: Журнал
Язык:English
Опубликовано: Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2017.
Серии:IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2017/277
Online-ссылка:Full text available on IMF
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245 1 0 |a Job Protection Deregulation in Good and Bad Times /  |c Romain Duval, Davide Furceri, Joao Tovar Jalles. 
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300 |a 1 online resource (44 pages) 
490 1 |a IMF Working Papers 
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520 3 |a This paper explores the short-term employment effect of deregulating job protection for regular workers and how it varies with prevailing business cycle conditions. We apply a local projection method to a newly constructed 'narrative' dataset of major regular job protection reforms covering 26 advanced economies over the past four decades. The analysis relies on country-sector-level data, using as an identifying assumption the fact that stringent dismissal regulations are more binding in sectors that are characterized by a higher 'natural' propensity to regularly adjust their workforce. We find that the responses of sectoral employment to large job protection deregulation shocks depend crucially on the state of the economy at the time of reform--they are positive in an expansion, but become negative in a recession. These findings are consistent with theory, and are robust to a broad range of robustness checks including an Instrumental Variable approach using political economy drivers of reforms as instruments. Our results provide a case for undertaking job protection reform in good times, or for designing it in ways that enhance its short-term impact. 
538 |a Mode of access: Internet 
700 1 |a Furceri, Davide. 
700 1 |a Jalles, Joao Tovar. 
830 0 |a IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;  |v No. 2017/277 
856 4 0 |z Full text available on IMF  |u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2017/277/001.2017.issue-277-en.xml  |z IMF e-Library