Back to the Future : The Nature of Regulatory Capital Requirements /

This paper compares the current regulatory capital requirements under the Dodd-Frank Act (DFA) and the 10-percent leverage ratio, as proposed by the U.S. Treasury and the U.S. House of Representatives' Financial CHOICE Act (FCA). We find that the majority of U.S. banks would not qualify for an...

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Bibliografiske detaljer
Hovedforfatter: Chami, Ralph
Andre forfattere: Cosimano, Thomas, Kopp, Emanuel, Rochon, Celine
Format: Tidsskrift
Sprog:English
Udgivet: Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2017.
Serier:IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2017/181
Online adgang:Full text available on IMF
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100 1 |a Chami, Ralph. 
245 1 0 |a Back to the Future :   |b The Nature of Regulatory Capital Requirements /  |c Ralph Chami, Thomas Cosimano, Emanuel Kopp, Celine Rochon. 
264 1 |a Washington, D.C. :  |b International Monetary Fund,  |c 2017. 
300 |a 1 online resource (20 pages) 
490 1 |a IMF Working Papers 
500 |a <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required 
500 |a <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required 
506 |a Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students 
520 3 |a This paper compares the current regulatory capital requirements under the Dodd-Frank Act (DFA) and the 10-percent leverage ratio, as proposed by the U.S. Treasury and the U.S. House of Representatives' Financial CHOICE Act (FCA). We find that the majority of U.S. banks would not qualify for an "off-ramp"option-where regulatory relief is offered to FCA qualifying banks (QBOs)-unless considerable amounts of capital are added, and that large banks are much closer to the proposed leverage threshold and, therefore, are more likely to stand to gain from regulatory relief. The paper identifies an important moral hazard problem that arises due to the QBO optionality, where banks are likely to increase the riskiness of their asset portfolio and qualify for the FCA 'off-ramp' relief with unintended effects on financial stability. 
538 |a Mode of access: Internet 
700 1 |a Cosimano, Thomas. 
700 1 |a Kopp, Emanuel. 
700 1 |a Rochon, Celine. 
830 0 |a IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;  |v No. 2017/181 
856 4 0 |z Full text available on IMF  |u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2017/181/001.2017.issue-181-en.xml  |z IMF e-Library