Trade-offs in Bank Resolution /
This SDN revisits the debate on bank resolution regimes, first by presenting a simple model of bank insolvency that transparently describes the trade-off involved between bail-outs, bail-ins, and larger capital buffers. The note then looks for empirical evidence to assess the moral hazard consequenc...
| Tác giả chính: | |
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| Tác giả khác: | , , |
| Định dạng: | Tạp chí |
| Ngôn ngữ: | English |
| Được phát hành: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2018.
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| Loạt: | Staff Discussion Notes; Staff Discussion Notes ;
No. 2018/002 |
| Truy cập trực tuyến: | Full text available on IMF |