Trade-offs in Bank Resolution /
This SDN revisits the debate on bank resolution regimes, first by presenting a simple model of bank insolvency that transparently describes the trade-off involved between bail-outs, bail-ins, and larger capital buffers. The note then looks for empirical evidence to assess the moral hazard consequenc...
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| Diğer Yazarlar: | , , |
| Materyal Türü: | Dergi |
| Dil: | English |
| Baskı/Yayın Bilgisi: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2018.
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| Seri Bilgileri: | Staff Discussion Notes; Staff Discussion Notes ;
No. 2018/002 |
| Online Erişim: | Full text available on IMF |