Trade-offs in Bank Resolution /
This SDN revisits the debate on bank resolution regimes, first by presenting a simple model of bank insolvency that transparently describes the trade-off involved between bail-outs, bail-ins, and larger capital buffers. The note then looks for empirical evidence to assess the moral hazard consequenc...
| প্রধান লেখক: | |
|---|---|
| অন্যান্য লেখক: | , , |
| বিন্যাস: | পত্রিকা |
| ভাষা: | English |
| প্রকাশিত: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2018.
|
| মালা: | Staff Discussion Notes; Staff Discussion Notes ;
No. 2018/002 |
| অনলাইন ব্যবহার করুন: | Full text available on IMF |