Who Dares, Wins : Labor Market Reforms and Sovereign Yields /
The paper shows that investors value the adoption of structural reforms by lending at lower cost. The reform-induced reduction of long-term yields is bigger when reforms are initiated in good times and in countries facing high borrowing costs. Importantly, there is no statistical evidence that marke...
| מחבר ראשי: | |
|---|---|
| פורמט: | כתב-עת |
| שפה: | English |
| יצא לאור: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2017.
|
| סדרה: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 2017/141 |
| גישה מקוונת: | Full text available on IMF |
| סיכום: | The paper shows that investors value the adoption of structural reforms by lending at lower cost. The reform-induced reduction of long-term yields is bigger when reforms are initiated in good times and in countries facing high borrowing costs. Importantly, there is no statistical evidence that markets systematically punish countries that launch reforms concomitantly with fiscal stimulus. The paper also finds that the social context matters: structural reforms lead to a short-lived overshooting of yields when followed by strikes or lockouts. Controlling for endogeneity issues does not reject the central finding of the paper. These results are economically plausible and confirmed even after using sovereign credit ratings as an alternative dependent variable. These results have two main implications: (i) on average, labor market reforms lower borrowing costs; and (ii) country-specific circumstances also play a role. |
|---|---|
| תאור פריט: | <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required |
| תיאור פיזי: | 1 online resource (33 pages) |
| פורמט: | Mode of access: Internet |
| ISSN: | 1018-5941 |
| גישה: | Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students |