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|z 9781475590180
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|a 1018-5941
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|a BD-DhAAL
|c BD-DhAAL
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|a Cantore, Cristiano.
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|a Optimal Fiscal and Monetary Policy, Debt Crisis and Management /
|c Cristiano Cantore, Paul Levine, Giovanni Melina, Joseph Pearlman.
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|a Washington, D.C. :
|b International Monetary Fund,
|c 2017.
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|a 1 online resource (44 pages)
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|a IMF Working Papers
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|a <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required
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|a <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required
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|a Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students
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|a The initial government debt-to-GDP ratio and the government's commitment play a pivotal role in determining the welfare-optimal speed of fiscal consolidation in the management of a debt crisis. Under commitment, for low or moderate initial government debt-to-GPD ratios, the optimal consolidation is very slow. A faster pace is optimal when the economy starts from a high level of public debt implying high sovereign risk premia, unless these are suppressed via a bailout by official creditors. Under discretion, the cost of not being able to commit is reflected into a quick consolidation of government debt. Simple monetary-fiscal rules with passive fiscal policy, designed for an environment with 'normal shocks', perform reasonably well in mimicking the Ramsey-optimal response to one-off government debt shocks. When the government can issue also long-term bonds-under commitment-the optimal debt consolidation pace is slower than in the case of short-term bonds only, and entails an increase in the ratio between long and short-term bonds.
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|a Mode of access: Internet
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|a Levine, Paul.
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|a Melina, Giovanni.
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|a Pearlman, Joseph.
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|a IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
|v No. 2017/078
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| 856 |
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|z Full text available on IMF
|u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2017/078/001.2017.issue-078-en.xml
|z IMF e-Library
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