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|z 9781475588675
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|a 1018-5941
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|c BD-DhAAL
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|a Kirti, Divya.
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|a How is the likelihood of fire sales in a crisis affected by the interaction of various bank regulations? /
|c Divya Kirti, Vijay Narasiman.
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|a Washington, D.C. :
|b International Monetary Fund,
|c 2017.
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|a 1 online resource (46 pages)
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|a IMF Working Papers
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|a <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required
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|a <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required
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|a Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students
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|a We present a model that describes how different types of bank regulation can interact to affect the likelihood of fire sales in a crisis. In our model, risk shifting motives drive how banks recapitalize following a negative shock, leading banks to concentrate their portfolios. Regulation affects the likelihood of fire sales by giving banks the incentive to sell certain assets and retain others. Ex-post incentives from high risk weights and the interaction of capital and liquidity requirements can make fire sales more likely. Time-varying risk weights may be an effective tool to prevent fire sales.
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|a Mode of access: Internet
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|a Narasiman, Vijay.
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|a IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
|v No. 2017/068
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| 856 |
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|z Full text available on IMF
|u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2017/068/001.2017.issue-068-en.xml
|z IMF e-Library
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