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01741cas a2200253 a 4500 |
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|c 5.00 USD
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|z 9781475570267
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|a 1018-5941
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|a BD-DhAAL
|c BD-DhAAL
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|a Keen, Michael.
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|a Optimal Tax Administration /
|c Michael Keen, Joel Slemrod.
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|a Washington, D.C. :
|b International Monetary Fund,
|c 2017.
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|a 1 online resource (27 pages)
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|a IMF Working Papers
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|a <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required
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|a <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required
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|a Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students
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|a This paper sets out a framework for analyzing optimal interventions by a tax administration, one that parallels and can be closely integrated with established frameworks for thinking about optimal tax policy. Its key contribution is the development of a summary measure of the impact of administrative interventions-the 'enforcement elasticity of tax revenue'-that is a sufficient statistic for the behavioral response to such interventions, much as the elasticity of taxable income serves as a sufficient statistic for the response to tax rates. Amongst the applications are characterizations of the optimal balance between policy and administrative measures, and of the optimal compliance gap.
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|a Mode of access: Internet
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|a Slemrod, Joel.
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|a IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
|v No. 2017/008
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| 856 |
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|z Full text available on IMF
|u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2017/008/001.2017.issue-008-en.xml
|z IMF e-Library
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