Fiscal Rules to Tame the Political Budget Cycle : Evidence from Italian Municipalities /

The paper provides evidence that fiscal rules can limit the political budget cycle. It focuses on the application of the Italian fiscal rule at the sub-national level over the period 2004-2006 and shows that: 1) municipalities are subject to political budget cycles in capital spending; 2) the Italia...

Täydet tiedot

Bibliografiset tiedot
Päätekijä: Forni, Lorenzo
Muut tekijät: Bonfatti, Andrea
Aineistotyyppi: Aikakauslehti
Kieli:English
Julkaistu: Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2017.
Sarja:IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2017/006
Linkit:Full text available on IMF