Fiscal Rules to Tame the Political Budget Cycle : Evidence from Italian Municipalities /

The paper provides evidence that fiscal rules can limit the political budget cycle. It focuses on the application of the Italian fiscal rule at the sub-national level over the period 2004-2006 and shows that: 1) municipalities are subject to political budget cycles in capital spending; 2) the Italia...

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Автор: Forni, Lorenzo
Інші автори: Bonfatti, Andrea
Формат: Журнал
Мова:English
Опубліковано: Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2017.
Серія:IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2017/006
Онлайн доступ:Full text available on IMF
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100 1 |a Forni, Lorenzo. 
245 1 0 |a Fiscal Rules to Tame the Political Budget Cycle :   |b Evidence from Italian Municipalities /  |c Lorenzo Forni, Andrea Bonfatti. 
264 1 |a Washington, D.C. :  |b International Monetary Fund,  |c 2017. 
300 |a 1 online resource (20 pages) 
490 1 |a IMF Working Papers 
500 |a <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required 
500 |a <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required 
506 |a Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students 
520 3 |a The paper provides evidence that fiscal rules can limit the political budget cycle. It focuses on the application of the Italian fiscal rule at the sub-national level over the period 2004-2006 and shows that: 1) municipalities are subject to political budget cycles in capital spending; 2) the Italian subnational fiscal rule introduced in 1999 has been enforced by the central government; 3) municipalities subject to the fiscal rule show more limited political budget cycles than municipalities not subject to the rule. In order to identify the effect, we rely on the fact that the domestic fiscal rule does not apply to municipalities below 5,000 inhabitants. We find that the political budget cycle increases real capital spending by about 35 percent on average in the years prior to municipal elections and that the sub-national fiscal rule reduces these figures by about two thirds. 
538 |a Mode of access: Internet 
700 1 |a Bonfatti, Andrea. 
830 0 |a IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;  |v No. 2017/006 
856 4 0 |z Full text available on IMF  |u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2017/006/001.2017.issue-006-en.xml  |z IMF e-Library