On the Determinants of Fiscal Non-Compliance : An Empirical Analysis of Spain's Regions /

This paper proposes an empirical framework that distinguishes voluntary from involuntary compliance with fiscal deficit targets on the basis of economic, institutional, and political factors. The framework is applied to Spain's Autonomous Communities (regions) over the period 2002-2015. Fiscal...

詳細記述

書誌詳細
第一著者: Delgado-Tellez, Mar
その他の著者: Lledo, Victor, Perez, Javier
フォーマット: 雑誌
言語:English
出版事項: Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2017.
シリーズ:IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2017/005
オンライン・アクセス:Full text available on IMF
その他の書誌記述
要約:This paper proposes an empirical framework that distinguishes voluntary from involuntary compliance with fiscal deficit targets on the basis of economic, institutional, and political factors. The framework is applied to Spain's Autonomous Communities (regions) over the period 2002-2015. Fiscal noncompliance among Spain's regions has shown to be persistent. It increases with the size of growth forecast errors and the extent to which fiscal targets are tightened, factors not fully under the control of regional governments. Non-compliance also tends to increase during election years, when vertical fiscal imbalances accentuate, and market financing costs subside. Strong fiscal rules have not shown any significant impact in containing fiscal non-compliance. Reducing fiscal non-compliance in multilevel governance systems such as the one in Spain requires a comprehensive assessment of intergovernmental fiscal arrangements that looks beyond rules-based frameworks by ensuring enforcement procedures are politically credible.
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物理的記述:1 online resource (33 pages)
フォーマット:Mode of access: Internet
ISSN:1018-5941
アクセス:Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students