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|c 5.00 USD
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|z 9781475568974
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|a 1018-5941
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|a BD-DhAAL
|c BD-DhAAL
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|a Kirti, Divya.
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|a Why Do Bank-Dependent Firms Bear Interest-Rate Risk? /
|c Divya Kirti.
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|a Washington, D.C. :
|b International Monetary Fund,
|c 2017.
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|a 1 online resource (56 pages)
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|a IMF Working Papers
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|a <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required
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|a <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required
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|a Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students
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|a I document that floating-rate loans from banks (particularly important for bank-dependent firms) drive most variation in firms' exposure to interest rates. I argue that banks lend to firms at floating rates because they themselves have floating-rate liabilities, supporting this with three key findings. Banks with more floating-rate liabilities, first, make more floating-rate loans, second, hold more floating-rate securities, and third, quote lower prices for floating-rate loans. My results establish an important link between intermediaries' funding structure and the types of contracts used by non-financial firms. They also highlight a role for banks in the balance-sheet channel of monetary policy.
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|a Mode of access: Internet
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|a IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
|v No. 2017/003
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|z Full text available on IMF
|u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2017/003/001.2017.issue-003-en.xml
|z IMF e-Library
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