Supervisory Incentives in a Banking Union /

We explore the behavior of supervisors when a centralized agency has full power over all decisions regarding banks, but relies on local supervisors to collect the information necessary to act. This institutional design entails a principal-agent problem between the central and local supervisors if th...

पूर्ण विवरण

ग्रंथसूची विवरण
मुख्य लेखक: Carletti, Elena
अन्य लेखक: Dell'Ariccia, Giovanni, Marquez, Robert
स्वरूप: पत्रिका
भाषा:English
प्रकाशित: Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2016.
श्रृंखला:IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2016/186
ऑनलाइन पहुंच:Full text available on IMF

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