Supervisory Incentives in a Banking Union /
We explore the behavior of supervisors when a centralized agency has full power over all decisions regarding banks, but relies on local supervisors to collect the information necessary to act. This institutional design entails a principal-agent problem between the central and local supervisors if th...
मुख्य लेखक: | Carletti, Elena |
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अन्य लेखक: | Dell'Ariccia, Giovanni, Marquez, Robert |
स्वरूप: | पत्रिका |
भाषा: | English |
प्रकाशित: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2016.
|
श्रृंखला: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 2016/186 |
ऑनलाइन पहुंच: | Full text available on IMF |