Optimal Debt Policy Under Asymmetric Risk /
In the paper we show that, most of the time, smooth reduction in the debt ratio is optimal for tax-smoothing purposes when fiscal risks are asymmetric, with large debt-augmenting shocks more likely than commensurate debt reducing shocks. Asymmetric risks are a feature of 200 years of data for the U....
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| Định dạng: | Tạp chí |
| Ngôn ngữ: | English |
| Được phát hành: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2016.
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| Loạt: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 2016/178 |
| Truy cập trực tuyến: | Full text available on IMF |
| Tóm tắt: | In the paper we show that, most of the time, smooth reduction in the debt ratio is optimal for tax-smoothing purposes when fiscal risks are asymmetric, with large debt-augmenting shocks more likely than commensurate debt reducing shocks. Asymmetric risks are a feature of 200 years of data for the U.S. and the U.K.: rare but recurrent large surges of the debt-to-GDP ratio, followed by very gradual but persistent declines over long periods. More informal evidence from many other countries suggests that asymmetry is a general feature of fiscal shocks. The gradual smooth reduction in the public debt to GDP ratio is not a response to past developments. Instead it is optimal given recurrent fiscal risks and the empirical characteristics of fiscal shocks. The behavior of the debt-to-GDP ratio in the U.K. and the U.S. seems roughly compatible with the prescriptions of the tax-smoothing model. |
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| Mô tả sách: | <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required |
| Mô tả vật lý: | 1 online resource (21 pages) |
| Định dạng: | Mode of access: Internet |
| số ISSN: | 1018-5941 |
| Truy cập: | Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students |