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|z 9781484365502
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|a 1018-5941
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|a Batini, Nicoletta.
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|a Fiscal Buffers, Private Debt, and Stagnation :
|b The Good, the Bad and the Ugly /
|c Nicoletta Batini, Giovanni Melina, Stefania Villa.
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|a Washington, D.C. :
|b International Monetary Fund,
|c 2016.
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|a 1 online resource (41 pages)
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|a IMF Working Papers
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|a <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required
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|a <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required
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|a Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students
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|a We revisit the empirical relationship between private/public debt and output, and build a model that reproduces it. In the model, the government provides financial assistance to credit-constrained agents to mitigate deleveraging. As we observe in the data, surges in private debt are potentially more damaging for the economy than surges in public debt. The model suggests two policy implications. First, capping leverage leads to milder recessions, but also implies more muted expansions. Second, with fiscal buffers, financial assistance to credit-constrained agents helps avoid stagnation. The growth returns from intervention decline as the government approaches the fiscal limit.
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|a Mode of access: Internet
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|a Melina, Giovanni.
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|a Villa, Stefania.
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|a IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
|v No. 2016/104
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| 856 |
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|z Full text available on IMF
|u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2016/104/001.2016.issue-104-en.xml
|z IMF e-Library
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