Do Subnational Fiscal Rules Foster Fiscal Discipline? : New Empirical Evidence from Europe /
This paper studies how fiscal rules interact with the intergovernmental fiscal framework to foster fiscal discipline among European subnational governments. We use political variables describing the fiscal attitudes of the central government as instruments to obtain consistent estimates of the impac...
Auteur principal: | Kotia, Ananya |
---|---|
Autres auteurs: | Lledo, Victor |
Format: | Revue |
Langue: | English |
Publié: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2016.
|
Collection: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 2016/084 |
Accès en ligne: | Full text available on IMF |
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