Macroeconomic Dimensions of Public-Private Partnerships /

The voluminous literature comparing public-private partnerships (P3s) and own-investment (OI) by the public sector is dominated by contributions from microeconomic theory. This paper gives macroeconomics a voice in the debate by investigating the repercussions of P3 vs. OI in a dynamic general equil...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor Principal: Buffie, Edward
Outros autores: Andreolli, Michele, Li, Bin Grace, Zanna, Luis-Felipe
Formato: Revista
Idioma:English
Publicado: Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2016.
Series:IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2016/078
Acceso en liña:Full text available on IMF
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245 1 0 |a Macroeconomic Dimensions of Public-Private Partnerships /  |c Edward Buffie, Michele Andreolli, Bin Grace Li, Luis-Felipe Zanna. 
264 1 |a Washington, D.C. :  |b International Monetary Fund,  |c 2016. 
300 |a 1 online resource (49 pages) 
490 1 |a IMF Working Papers 
500 |a <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required 
500 |a <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required 
506 |a Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students 
520 3 |a The voluminous literature comparing public-private partnerships (P3s) and own-investment (OI) by the public sector is dominated by contributions from microeconomic theory. This paper gives macroeconomics a voice in the debate by investigating the repercussions of P3 vs. OI in a dynamic general equilibrium model featuring private capital accumulation and involuntary unemployment with efficiency wages. Typically P3s cost more but produce higher-quality infrastructure and boast a better on-time completion record than OI; consequently, they are comparatively more effective in reducing underinvestment in private capital, underinvestment in infrastructure, unemployment and poverty. The asymmetric impact on macro externalities raises the social return in the P3 2 - 9 percentage points relative to the social return to OI, depending on whether the externalities operate singly or in combination and on whether P3 enjoys an advantage in speed of construction. 
538 |a Mode of access: Internet 
700 1 |a Andreolli, Michele. 
700 1 |a Li, Bin Grace. 
700 1 |a Zanna, Luis-Felipe. 
830 0 |a IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;  |v No. 2016/078 
856 4 0 |z Full text available on IMF  |u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2016/078/001.2016.issue-078-en.xml  |z IMF e-Library